70
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
conceal their identity” as the sponsor of those communica
tions, thereby frustrating the utility of disclosure laws.
McConnell, 540 U. S., at 128; see also id., at 196–197.
And it underscores that the consequences of today’s
holding will not be limited to the legislative or executive
context. The majority of the States select their judges
through popular elections. At a time when concerns about
the conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch,
see, e.g., O’Connor, Justice for Sale, Wall St. Journal, Nov.
15, 2007, p. A25; Brief for Justice at Stake et al. as Amici
Curiae 2, the Court today unleashes the floodgates of
corporate and union general treasury spending in these
races. Perhaps “Caperton motions” will catch some of the
worst abuses. This will be small comfort to those States
that, after today, may no longer have the ability to place
modest limits on corporate electioneering even if they
believe such limits to be critical to maintaining the integ
rity of their judicial systems.
Deference and Incumbent Self-Protection
Rather than show any deference to a coordinate branch
of Government, the majority thus rejects the anticorrup
tion rationale without serious analysis.67 Today’s opinion
provides no clear rationale for being so dismissive of Con
gress, but the prior individual opinions on which it relies
have offered one: the incentives of the legislators who
passed BCRA. Section 203, our colleagues have suggested,
may be little more than “an incumbency protection plan,”
McConnell, 540 U. S., at 306 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also id., at
249–250, 260–263 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part, concur
ring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part), a dis
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67 “We
must give weight” and “due deference” to Congress’ efforts to
dispel corruption, the Court states at one point. Ante, at 45. It is
unclear to me what these maxims mean, but as applied by the Court
they clearly do not entail “deference” in any normal sense of that term.