72
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 447 (2006) (STEVENS, J., concur
ring in part and dissenting in part); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U. S. 267, 317 (2004) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Along
with our duty to balance competing constitutional con
cerns, we have a vital role to play in ensuring that elec
tions remain at least minimally open, fair, and competi
tive. But it is the height of recklessness to dismiss
Congress’ years of bipartisan deliberation and its reasoned
judgment on this basis, without first confirming that the
statute in question was intended to be, or will function as,
a restraint on electoral competition. “Absent record evi
dence of invidious discrimination against challengers as a
class, a court should generally be hesitant to invalidate
legislation which on its face imposes evenhanded restric
tions.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 31.
We have no record evidence from which to conclude that
BCRA §203, or any of the dozens of state laws that the
Court today calls into question, reflects or fosters such
invidious discrimination. Our colleagues have opined that
“ ‘any restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is
equally available to challengers and incumbents tends to
favor incumbents.’ ” McConnell, 540 U. S., at 249 (opinion
of SCALIA, J.). This kind of airy speculation could easily be
turned on its head. The electioneering prohibited by §203
might well tend to favor incumbents, because incumbents
have pre-existing relationships with corporations and
unions, and groups that wish to procure legislative bene
fits may tend to support the candidate who, as a sitting
officeholder, is already in a position to dispense benefits
and is statistically likely to retain office. If a corporation’s
goal is to induce officeholders to do its bidding, the corpo
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lows: “We should defer to [the legislature’s] political judgment that
unlimited spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process. But
we should not defer in respect to whether its solution . . . insulates
legislators from effective electoral challenge.” Shrink Missouri, 528
U. S., at 403–404 (concurring opinion).