Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010)
73
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
ration would do well to cultivate stable, long-term rela
tionships of dependency.
So we do not have a solid theoretical basis for condemn
ing §203 as a front for incumbent self-protection, and it
seems equally if not more plausible that restrictions on
corporate electioneering will be self-denying. Nor do we
have a good empirical case for skepticism, as the Court’s
failure to cite any empirical research attests. Nor does the
legislative history give reason for concern. Congress
devoted years of careful study to the issues underlying
BCRA; “[f]ew legislative proposals in recent years have
received as much sustained public commentary or news
coverage”; “[p]olitical scientists and academic experts . . .
with no self-interest in incumbent protectio[n] were cen
tral figures in pressing the case for BCRA”; and the legis
lation commanded bipartisan support from the outset.
Pildes, The Supreme Court 2003 Term Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv.
L. Rev. 28, 137 (2004). Finally, it is important to remem
ber just how incumbent-friendly congressional races were
prior to BCRA’s passage. As the Solicitor General aptly
remarked at the time, “the evidence supports overwhelm
ingly that incumbents were able to get re-elected under
the old system just fine.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in McConnell v.
FEC, O. T. 2003, No. 02–1674, p. 61. “It would be hard to
develop a scheme that could be better for incumbents.”
Id., at 63.
In this case, then, “there is no convincing evidence that
th[e] important interests favoring expenditure limits are
fronts for incumbency protection.” Randall, 548 U. S., at
279 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). “In the meantime, a legisla
tive judgment that ‘enough is enough’ should command
the greatest possible deference from judges interpreting a
constitutional provision that, at best, has an indirect
relationship to activity that affects the quantity . . . of
repetitive speech in the marketplace of ideas.” Id., at 279–