Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 79 Opinion of STEVENS, J. In short, regulations such as §203 and the statute up­ held in Austin impose only a limited burden on First Amendment freedoms not only because they target a narrow subset of expenditures and leave untouched the broader “public dialogue,” ante, at 25, but also because they leave untouched the speech of natural persons. Recognizing the weakness of a speaker-based critique of Austin, the Court places primary emphasis not on the corporation’s right to electioneer, but rather on the lis­ tener’s interest in hearing what every possible speaker may have to say. The Court’s central argument is that laws such as §203 have “ ‘deprived [the electorate] of in­ formation, knowledge and opinion vital to its function,’ ” ante, at 38 (quoting CIO, 335 U. S., at 144 (Rutledge, J., concurring in judgment)), and this, in turn, “interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment,” ante, at 38 (quoting New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208 (2008)). There are many flaws in this argument. If the overrid­ ing concern depends on the interests of the audience, surely the public’s perception of the value of corporate speech should be given important weight. That perception today is the same as it was a century ago when Theodore Roosevelt delivered the speeches to Congress that, in time, led to the limited prohibition on corporate campaign ex­ penditures that is overruled today. See WRTL, 551 U. S., at 509–510 (Souter, J., dissenting) (summarizing President —————— owners may speak in their own names, rather than the business’, if they wish to evade §203 altogether. Nonprofit corporations that want to make unrestricted electioneering expenditures may do so if they refuse donations from businesses and unions and permit members to disassociate without economic penalty. See MCFL, 479 U. S. 238, 264 (1986). Making it plain that their decision is not motivated by a con­ cern about BCRA’s coverage of nonprofits that have ideological mis­ sions but lack MCFL status, our colleagues refuse to apply the SnoweJeffords Amendment or the lower courts’ de minimis exception to MCFL. See ante, at 10–12.