Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 25 Opinion of the Court tion marks omitted)); Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Car riers, 413 U. S. 548, 557 (1973) (“[F]ederal service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than politi cal service”). The corporate independent expenditures at issue in this case, however, would not interfere with gov ernmental functions, so these cases are inapposite. These precedents stand only for the proposition that there are certain governmental functions that cannot operate with out some restrictions on particular kinds of speech. By contrast, it is inherent in the nature of the political proc ess that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes. At least before Austin, the Court had not allowed the exclusion of a class of speakers from the general public dialogue. We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restric tions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead us to this conclusion. A 1 The Court has recognized that First Amendment protec tion extends to corporations. Bellotti, supra, at 778, n. 14 (citing Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85 (1977); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S. 448 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 (1975); Southeast ern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254; Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U. S. 684 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952)); see, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,

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