Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010)
25
Opinion of the Court
tion marks omitted)); Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Car
riers, 413 U. S. 548, 557 (1973) (“[F]ederal service should
depend upon meritorious performance rather than politi
cal service”). The corporate independent expenditures at
issue in this case, however, would not interfere with gov
ernmental functions, so these cases are inapposite. These
precedents stand only for the proposition that there are
certain governmental functions that cannot operate with
out some restrictions on particular kinds of speech. By
contrast, it is inherent in the nature of the political proc
ess that voters must be free to obtain information from
diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their
votes. At least before Austin, the Court had not allowed
the exclusion of a class of speakers from the general public
dialogue.
We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context
of political speech, the Government may impose restric
tions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and
logic lead us to this conclusion.
A
1
The Court has recognized that First Amendment protec
tion extends to corporations. Bellotti, supra, at 778, n. 14
(citing Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S.
85 (1977); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S. 448 (1976);
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 (1975); Southeast
ern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971)
(per curiam); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254; Kingsley Int’l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U. S. 684
(1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495
(1952)); see, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,