Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010)
29
Opinion of the Court
Before addressing the constitutionality of §608(e)’s
independent expenditure ban, Buckley first upheld
§608(b), FECA’s limits on direct contributions to candi
dates. The Buckley Court recognized a “sufficiently impor
tant” governmental interest in “the prevention of corrup
tion and the appearance of corruption.” Id., at 25; see id.,
at 26. This followed from the Court’s concern that large
contributions could be given “to secure a political quid pro
quo.” Ibid.
The Buckley Court explained that the potential for quid
pro quo corruption distinguished direct contributions to
candidates from independent expenditures. The Court
emphasized that “the independent expenditure ceiling . . .
fails to serve any substantial governmental interest in
stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the
electoral process,” id., at 47–48, because “[t]he absence of
prearrangement and coordination . . . alleviates the dan
ger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for
improper commitments from the candidate,” id., at 47.
Buckley invalidated §608(e)’s restrictions on independent
expenditures, with only one Justice dissenting. See Fed
eral Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 491, n. 3 (1985) (NCPAC).
Buckley did not consider §610’s separate ban on corpo
rate and union independent expenditures, the prohibition
that had also been in the background in CIO, Automobile
Workers, and Pipefitters. Had §610 been challenged in the
wake of Buckley, however, it could not have been squared
with the reasoning and analysis of that precedent. See
WRTL, supra, at 487 (opinion of SCALIA, J.) (“Buckley
might well have been the last word on limitations on
independent expenditures”); Austin, 494 U. S., at 683
(SCALIA, J., dissenting). The expenditure ban invalidated
in Buckley, §608(e), applied to corporations and unions,
424 U. S., at 23, 39, n. 45; and some of the prevailing
plaintiffs in Buckley were corporations, id., at 8. The