4
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Syllabus
preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in the
political speech context, the Government may impose restrictions on
certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this con
clusion. Pp. 20–25.
(b) The Court has recognized that the First Amendment applies
to corporations, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S.
765, 778, n. 14, and extended this protection to the context of political
speech, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428–429. Address
ing challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the
Buckley Court upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates, 18
U. S. C. §608(b), recognizing a governmental interest in preventing
quid pro quo corruption. 424 U. S., at 25–26. However, the Court in
validated §608(e)’s expenditure ban, which applied to individuals,
corporations, and unions, because it “fail[ed] to serve any substantial
governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of cor
ruption in the electoral process,” id., at 47–48. While Buckley did not
consider a separate ban on corporate and union independent expendi
tures found in §610, had that provision been challenged in Buckley’s
wake, it could not have been squared with the precedent’s reasoning
and analysis. The Buckley Court did not invoke the overbreadth doc
trine to suggest that §608(e)’s expenditure ban would have been con
stitutional had it applied to corporations and unions but not indi
viduals. Notwithstanding this precedent, Congress soon recodified
§610’s corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U. S. C. §441b, the
provision at issue. Less than two years after Buckley, Bellotti reaf
firmed the First Amendment principle that the Government lacks the
power to restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate
identity. 435 U.S., at 784–785. Thus the law stood until Austin up
held a corporate independent expenditure restriction, bypassing
Buckley and Bellotti by recognizing a new governmental interest in
preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega
tions of [corporate] wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 494 U. S., at
660. Pp. 25–32.
(c) This Court is confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a
pre-Austin line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s
corporate identity and a post-Austin line permitting them. Neither
Austin’s antidistortion rationale nor the Government’s other justifica
tions support §441b’s restrictions. Pp. 32–47.
(1) The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or
jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for engaging in political
speech, but Austin’s antidistortion rationale would permit the Gov
ernment to ban political speech because the speaker is an association
with a corporate form. Political speech is “indispensable to decision