Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 3 Opinion of STEVENS, J. Court today rejects a century of history when it treats the distinction between corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born of Austin v. Michi gan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990). Relying largely on individual dissenting opinions, the majority blazes through our precedents, overruling or disavowing a body of case law including FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (2007) (WRTL), McConnell v. FEC, 540 U. S. 93 (2003), FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146 (2003), FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), NRWC, 459 U. S. 197, and California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182 (1981). In his landmark concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936), Justice Brandeis stressed the impor­ tance of adhering to rules the Court has “developed . . . for its own governance” when deciding constitutional ques­ tions. Because departures from those rules always en­ hance the risk of error, I shall review the background of this case in some detail before explaining why the Court’s analysis rests on a faulty understanding of Austin and McConnell and of our campaign finance jurisprudence more generally .1 I regret the length of what follows, but the importance and novelty of the Court’s opinion require a full response. Although I concur in the Court’s decision to sustain BCRA’s disclosure provisions and join Part IV of its opinion, I emphatically dissent from its principal holding. —————— 1 Specifically, Part I, infra, at 4–17, addresses the procedural history of the case and the narrower grounds of decision the majority has bypassed. Part II, infra, at 17–23, addresses stare decisis. Part III, infra, at 23–56, addresses the Court’s assumptions that BCRA “bans” corporate speech, that identity-based distinctions may not be drawn in the political realm, and that Austin and McConnell were outliers in our First Amendment tradition. Part IV, infra, at 56–89, addresses the Court’s treatment of the anticorruption, antidistortion, and shareholder protection rationales for regulating corporate electioneering.

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