Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010)
33
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
the governmental interests are of the highest order. Fur
thermore, when corporations, as a class, are distinguished
from noncorporations, as a class, there is a lesser risk that
regulatory distinctions will reflect invidious discrimina
tion or political favoritism.
If taken seriously, our colleagues’ assumption that the
identity of a speaker has no relevance to the Government’s
ability to regulate political speech would lead to some
remarkable conclusions. Such an assumption would have
accorded the propaganda broadcasts to our troops by
“Tokyo Rose” during World War II the same protection as
speech by Allied commanders. More pertinently, it would
appear to afford the same protection to multinational
corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual
Americans: To do otherwise, after all, could “ ‘enhance the
relative voice’ ” of some (i.e., humans) over others (i.e.,
nonhumans). Ante, at 33 (quoting Buckley, 424 U. S., at
49).51 Under the majority’s view, I suppose it may be a
First Amendment problem that corporations are not per
mitted to vote, given that voting is, among other things, a
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51 The
Court all but confesses that a categorical approach to speaker
identity is untenable when it acknowledges that Congress might be
allowed to take measures aimed at “preventing foreign individuals or
associations from influencing our Nation’s political process.” Ante, at
46–47. Such measures have been a part of U. S. campaign finance law
for many years. The notion that Congress might lack the authority to
distinguish foreigners from citizens in the regulation of electioneering
would certainly have surprised the Framers, whose “obsession with
foreign influence derived from a fear that foreign powers and individu
als had no basic investment in the well-being of the country.”
Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 393,
n. 245 (2009) (hereinafter Teachout); see also U. S. Const., Art. I, §9, cl.
8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust . . . shall, without
the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office,
or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State”).
Professor Teachout observes that a corporation might be analogized to
a foreign power in this respect, “inasmuch as its legal loyalties neces
sarily exclude patriotism.” Teachout 393, n. 245.