66
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
candidates used corporate independent expenditures to
circumvent FECA’s “hard-money” limitations. See, e.g.,
id., at 478–479. One former Senator candidly admitted to
the District Court that “ ‘[c]andidates whose campaigns
benefit from [phony “issue ads”] greatly appreciate the
help of these groups. In fact, Members will also be favora
bly disposed to those who finance these groups when they
later seek access to discuss pending legislation.’ ” Id., at
556 (quoting declaration of Sen. Dale Bumpers). One
prominent lobbyist went so far as to state, in uncontro
verted testimony, that “ ‘unregulated expenditures—
whether soft money donations to the parties or issue ad
campaigns—can sometimes generate far more influence
than direct campaign contributions.’ ” Ibid. (quoting decla
ration of Wright Andrews; emphasis added). In sum,
Judge Kollar-Kotelly found, “[t]he record powerfully dem
onstrates that electioneering communications paid for with
the general treasury funds of labor unions and corpora
tions endears those entities to elected officials in a way
that could be perceived by the public as corrupting.” Id., at
622–623. She concluded that the Government’s interest in
preventing the appearance of corruption, as that concept
was defined in Buckley, was itself sufficient to uphold
BCRA §203. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 622–625. Judge Leon
agreed. See id., at 804–805 (dissenting only with respect to the Wellstone Amendment’s coverage of MCFL
corporations).
When the McConnell Court affirmed the judgment of the
District Court regarding §203, we did not rest our holding
on a narrow notion of quid pro quo corruption. Instead we
relied on the governmental interest in combating the
unique forms of corruption threatened by corporations, as
recognized in Austin’s antidistortion and shareholder
protection rationales, 540 U. S., at 205 (citing Austin, 494
U. S., at 660), as well as the interest in preventing cir
cumvention of contribution limits, 540 U. S., at 128–129,