74
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
280. The majority cavalierly ignores Congress’ factual
findings and its constitutional judgment: It acknowledges
the validity of the interest in preventing corruption, but it
effectively discounts the value of that interest to zero.
This is quite different from conscientious policing for
impermissibly anticompetitive motive or effect in a sensi
tive First Amendment context. It is the denial of Con
gress’ authority to regulate corporate spending on
elections.
Austin and Corporate Expenditures
Just as the majority gives short shrift to the general
societal interests at stake in campaign finance regulation,
it also overlooks the distinctive considerations raised by
the regulation of corporate expenditures. The majority
fails to appreciate that Austin’s antidistortion rationale is
itself an anticorruption rationale, see 494 U. S., at 660
(describing “a different type of corruption”), tied to the
special concerns raised by corporations. Understood prop
erly, “antidistortion” is simply a variant on the classic
governmental interest in protecting against improper
influences on officeholders that debilitate the democratic
process. It is manifestly not just an “ ‘equalizing’ ” ideal in
disguise. Ante, at 34 (quoting Buckley, 424 U. S., at 48).69
——————
69 THE
CHIEF JUSTICE denies this, ante, at 9–10, citing scholarship
that has interpreted Austin to endorse an equality rationale, along with
an article by Justice Thurgood Marshall’s former law clerk that states
that Marshall, the author of Austin, accepted “equality of opportunity”
and “equalizing access to the political process” as bases for campaign
finance regulation, Garrett, New Voices in Politics: Justice Marshall’s
Jurisprudence on Law and Politics, 52 Howard L. J. 655, 667–668
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is fair to say that Austin
can bear an egalitarian reading, and I have no reason to doubt this
characterization of Justice Marshall’s beliefs. But the fact that Austin
can be read a certain way hardly proves THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s charge
that there is nothing more to it. Many of our precedents can bear
multiple readings, and many of our doctrines have some “equalizing”
implications but do not rest on an equalizing theory: for example, our