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CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
purpose.
References to massive corporate treasuries
should not mask the real operation of this law. Rhetoric
ought not obscure reality.
Even if §441b’s expenditure ban were constitutional,
wealthy corporations could still lobby elected officials,
although smaller corporations may not have the resources
to do so. And wealthy individuals and unincorporated
associations can spend unlimited amounts on independent
expenditures. See, e.g., WRTL, 551 U. S., at 503–504
(opinion of SCALIA, J.) (“In the 2004 election cycle, a mere
24 individuals contributed an astounding total of $142
million to [26 U. S. C. §527 organizations]”). Yet certain
disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken
on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the
same political speech.
When Government seeks to use its full power, including
the criminal law, to command where a person may get his
or her information or what distrusted source he or she
may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This
is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom
to think for ourselves.
2
What we have said also shows the invalidity of other
arguments made by the Government. For the most part
relinquishing the antidistortion rationale, the Government
falls back on the argument that corporate political speech
can be banned in order to prevent corruption or its ap
pearance. In Buckley, the Court found this interest “suffi
ciently important” to allow limits on contributions but did
not extend that reasoning to expenditure limits. 424 U. S.,
at 25. When Buckley examined an expenditure ban, it
found “that the governmental interest in preventing cor
ruption and the appearance of corruption [was] inade
quate to justify [the ban] on independent expenditures.”
Id., at 45.