Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 43 Opinion of the Court political debts from legislators who are aided by the con tributions.” 459 U. S., at 207–208 (citing Automobile Workers, 352 U. S., at 579); see 459 U. S., at 210, and n. 7; NCPAC, supra, at 500–501 (NRWC suggested a govern mental interest in restricting “the influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate form”). NRWC, however, has little relevance here. NRWC decided no more than that a restriction on a corporation’s ability to solicit funds for its segregated PAC, which made direct contributions to candidates, did not violate the First Amendment. 459 U. S., at 206. NRWC thus involved contribution limits, see NCPAC, supra, at 495–496, which, unlike limits on independent expenditures, have been an accepted means to prevent quid pro quo corruption, see McConnell, 540 U. S., at 136–138, and n. 40; MCFL, su pra, at 259–260. Citizens United has not made direct contributions to candidates, and it has not suggested that the Court should reconsider whether contribution limits should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny. When Buckley identified a sufficiently important gov ernmental interest in preventing corruption or the ap pearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption. See McConnell, supra, at 296–298 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) (citing Buckley, supra, at 26–28, 30, 46–48); NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 497 (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for politi cal favors”); id., at 498. The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt: “Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contribu tors who support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the

Select target paragraph3