Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 51 Opinion of the Court must be made in a “clearly spoken manner,” and displayed on the screen in a “clearly readable manner” for at least four seconds. Ibid. It must state that the communication “is not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s commit tee”; it must also display the name and address (or Web site address) of the person or group that funded the adver tisement. §441d(a)(3). Under BCRA §201, any person who spends more than $10,000 on electioneering commu nications within a calendar year must file a disclosure statement with the FEC. 2 U. S. C. §434(f)(1). That statement must identify the person making the expendi ture, the amount of the expenditure, the election to which the communication was directed, and the names of certain contributors. §434(f)(2). Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they “impose no ceiling on campaign related activities,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64, and “do not prevent anyone from speaking,” McConnell, supra, at 201 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The Court has subjected these requirements to “exacting scru tiny,” which requires a “substantial relation” between the disclosure requirement and a “sufficiently important” governmental interest. Buckley, supra, at 64, 66 (internal quotation marks omitted); see McConnell, supra, at 231– 232. In Buckley, the Court explained that disclosure could be justified based on a governmental interest in “provid[ing] the electorate with information” about the sources of election-related spending. 424 U. S., at 66. The McCon nell Court applied this interest in rejecting facial chal lenges to BCRA §§201 and 311. 540 U. S., at 196. There was evidence in the record that independent groups were running election-related advertisements “ ‘while hiding behind dubious and misleading names.’ ” Id., at 197 (quot ing McConnell I, 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 237). The Court therefore upheld BCRA §§201 and 311 on the ground that