2
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
“the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is
called upon to perform.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142,
147–148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). Because the
stakes are so high, our standard practice is to refrain from
addressing constitutional questions except when necessary
to rule on particular claims before us. See Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346–348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur
ring). This policy underlies both our willingness to con
strue ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional problems
and our practice “ ‘never to formulate a rule of constitu
tional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.’ ” United States v. Raines, 362
U. S. 17, 21 (1960) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Phila
delphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113
U. S. 33, 39 (1885)).
The majority and dissent are united in expressing alle
giance to these principles. Ante, at 12; post, at 14
(STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
But I cannot agree with my dissenting colleagues on how
these principles apply in this case.
The majority’s step-by-step analysis accords with our
standard practice of avoiding broad constitutional ques
tions except when necessary to decide the case before us.
The majority begins by addressing—and quite properly
rejecting—Citizens United’s statutory claim that 2 U. S. C.
§441b does not actually cover its production and distribu
tion of Hillary: The Movie (hereinafter Hillary). If there
were a valid basis for deciding this statutory claim in
Citizens United’s favor (and thereby avoiding constitu
tional adjudication), it would be proper to do so. Indeed,
that is precisely the approach the Court took just last
Term in Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U. S. ___ (2009), when eight Members of the
Court agreed to decide the case on statutory grounds
instead of reaching the appellant’s broader argument that
the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional.