Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010)
23
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
nell comes down to nothing more than its disagreement
with their results. Virtually every one of its arguments
was made and rejected in those cases, and the majority
opinion is essentially an amalgamation of resuscitated
dissents. The only relevant thing that has changed since
Austin and McConnell is the composition of this Court.
Today’s ruling thus strikes at the vitals of stare decisis,
“the means by which we ensure that the law will not
merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled
and intelligible fashion” that “permits society to presume
that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than
in the proclivities of individuals.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U. S. 254, 265 (1986).
III
The novelty of the Court’s procedural dereliction and its
approach to stare decisis is matched by the novelty of its
ruling on the merits. The ruling rests on several premises.
First, the Court claims that Austin and McConnell have
“banned” corporate speech. Second, it claims that the
First Amendment precludes regulatory distinctions based
on speaker identity, including the speaker’s identity as a
corporation. Third, it claims that Austin and McConnell
were radical outliers in our First Amendment tradition
and our campaign finance jurisprudence. Each of these
claims is wrong.
The So-Called “Ban”
Pervading the Court’s analysis is the ominous image of
a “categorical ba[n]” on corporate speech. Ante, at 45.
Indeed, the majority invokes the specter of a “ban” on
nearly every page of its opinion. Ante, at 1, 4, 7, 10, 11,
12, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35, 38,
40, 42, 45, 46, 47, 49, 54, 56. This characterization is
highly misleading, and needs to be corrected.
In fact it already has been. Our cases have repeatedly