40 CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of STEVENS, J. have lesser status than individual speech, that may well be because the contrary proposition—if not also the very notion of “corporate speech”—was inconceivable.56 JUSTICE SCALIA also emphasizes the unqualified nature of the First Amendment text. Ante, at 2, 8. Yet he would seemingly read out the Free Press Clause: How else could he claim that my purported views on newspapers must track my views on corporations generally? Ante, at 6.57 Like virtually all modern lawyers, JUSTICE SCALIA pre­ sumably believes that the First Amendment restricts the Executive, even though its language refers to Congress alone. In any event, the text only leads us back to the questions who or what is guaranteed “the freedom of speech,” and, just as critically, what that freedom consists of and under what circumstances it may be limited. JUSTICE SCALIA appears to believe that because corpora­ tions are created and utilized by individuals, it follows (as —————— 56 Postratification practice bolsters the conclusion that the First Amendment, “as originally understood,” ante, at 37, did not give corpo­ rations political speech rights on a par with the rights of individuals. Well into the modern era of general incorporation statutes, “[t]he common law was generally interpreted as prohibiting corporate politi­ cal participation,” First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 819 (1978) (White, J., dissenting), and this Court did not recognize any First Amendment protections for corporations until the middle part of the 20th century, see ante, at 25–26 (listing cases). 57 In fact, the Free Press Clause might be turned against JUSTICE SCALIA, for two reasons. First, we learn from it that the drafters of the First Amendment did draw distinctions—explicit distinctions—between types of “speakers,” or speech outlets or forms. Second, the Court’s strongest historical evidence all relates to the Framers’ views on the press, see ante, at 37–38; ante, at 4–6 (SCALIA, J., concurring), yet while the Court tries to sweep this evidence into the Free Speech Clause, the Free Press Clause provides a more natural textual home. The text and history highlighted by our colleagues suggests why one type of corpora­ tion, those that are part of the press, might be able to claim special First Amendment status, and therefore why some kinds of “identity”­ based distinctions might be permissible after all. Once one accepts that much, the intellectual edifice of the majority opinion crumbles.