Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010)
41
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
night the day) that their electioneering must be equally
protected by the First Amendment and equally immunized
from expenditure limits. See ante, at 7–8. That conclu
sion certainly does not follow as a logical matter, and
JUSTICE SCALIA fails to explain why the original public
meaning leads it to follow as a matter of interpretation.
The truth is we cannot be certain how a law such as
BCRA §203 meshes with the original meaning of the First
Amendment.58 I have given several reasons why I believe
the Constitution would have been understood then, and
ought to be understood now, to permit reasonable restric
tions on corporate electioneering, and I will give many
more reasons in the pages to come. The Court enlists the
Framers in its defense without seriously grappling with
their understandings of corporations or the free speech
right, or with the republican principles that underlay
those understandings.
In fairness, our campaign finance jurisprudence has
never attended very closely to the views of the Framers,
see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 280 (2006) (STEVENS,
J., dissenting), whose political universe differed pro
foundly from that of today. We have long since held that
corporations are covered by the First Amendment, and
many legal scholars have long since rejected the conces
sion theory of the corporation. But “historical context is
usually relevant,” ibid. (internal quotation marks omit
ted), and in light of the Court’s effort to cast itself as
guardian of ancient values, it pays to remember that
nothing in our constitutional history dictates today’s
outcome. To the contrary, this history helps illuminate
just how extraordinarily dissonant the decision is.
——————
58 Cf.
L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in
Early American History 4 (1960) (“The meaning of no other clause of
the Bill of Rights at the time of its framing and ratification has been so
obscure to us” as the Free Speech and Press Clause).