52
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
Buckley’s independent expenditure analysis was focused
on a very different statutory provision, 18 U. S. C.
§608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. V). It is implausible to think,
as the majority suggests, ante, at 29–30, that Buckley
covertly invalidated FECA’s separate corporate and union
campaign expenditure restriction, §610 (now codified at 2
U. S. C. §441b), even though that restriction had been on
the books for decades before Buckley and would remain on
the books, undisturbed, for decades after.
The case on which the majority places even greater
weight than Buckley, however, is Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765,
claiming it “could not have been clearer” that Bellotti’s
holding forbade distinctions between corporate and indi
vidual expenditures like the one at issue here, ante, at 30.
The Court’s reliance is odd. The only thing about Bellotti
that could not be clearer is that it declined to adopt the
majority’s position. Bellotti ruled, in an explicit limitation
on the scope of its holding, that “our consideration of a
corporation’s right to speak on issues of general public
interest implies no comparable right in the quite different
context of participation in a political campaign for election
to public office.” 435 U. S., at 788, n. 26; see also id., at
787–788 (acknowledging that the interests in preserving
public confidence in Government and protecting dissenting
shareholders may be “weighty . . . in the context of parti
san candidate elections”). Bellotti, in other words, did not
touch the question presented in Austin and McConnell,
and the opinion squarely disavowed the proposition for
which the majority cites it.
The majority attempts to explain away the distinction
Bellotti drew—between general corporate speech and
campaign speech intended to promote or prevent the
election of specific candidates for office—as inconsistent
with the rest of the opinion and with Buckley. Ante, at 31,
42–44. Yet the basis for this distinction is perfectly coher
ent: The anticorruption interests that animate regulations