Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010)
53
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
of corporate participation in candidate elections, the “im
portance” of which “has never been doubted,” 435 U. S., at
788, n. 26, do not apply equally to regulations of corporate
participation in referenda. A referendum cannot owe a
political debt to a corporation, seek to curry favor with a
corporation, or fear the corporation’s retaliation. Cf. Aus
tin, 494 U. S., at 678 (STEVENS, J., concurring); Citizens
Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berke
ley, 454 U. S. 290, 299 (1981). The majority likewise
overlooks the fact that, over the past 30 years, our cases
have repeatedly recognized the candidate/issue distinc
tion. See, e.g., Austin, 494 U. S., at 659; NCPAC, 470
U. S., at 495–496; FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.,
468 U. S. 364, 371, n. 9 (1984); NRWC, 459 U. S., at 210,
n. 7. The Court’s critique of Bellotti’s footnote 26 puts it in
the strange position of trying to elevate Bellotti to canoni
cal status, while simultaneously disparaging a critical
piece of its analysis as unsupported and irreconcilable
with Buckley. Bellotti, apparently, is both the font of all
wisdom and internally incoherent.
The Bellotti Court confronted a dramatically different
factual situation from the one that confronts us in this
case: a state statute that barred business corporations’
expenditures on some referenda but not others. Specifi
cally, the statute barred a business corporation “from
making contributions or expenditures ‘for the purpose of
. . . influencing or affecting the vote on any question sub
mitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting
any of the property, business or assets of the corporation,’ ”
435 U. S., at 768 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 55,
§8 (West Supp. 1977); alteration in original), and it went
so far as to provide that referenda related to income taxa
tion would not “ ‘be deemed materially to affect the prop
erty, business or assets of the corporation,’ ” 435 U. S., at
768. As might be guessed, the legislature had enacted this
statute in order to limit corporate speech on a proposed