Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 63 Opinion of STEVENS, J. to a disastrous extent.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). A democracy cannot func­ tion effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being bought and sold. In theory, our colleagues accept this much. As applied to BCRA §203, however, they conclude “[t]he anticorrup­ tion interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here in question.” Ante, at 41. Although the Court suggests that Buckley compels its conclusion, ante, at 40–44, Buckley cannot sustain this reading. It is true that, in evaluating FECA’s ceiling on independent expenditures by all persons, the Buckley Court found the governmental interest in preventing corruption “inadequate.” 424 U. S., at 45. But Buckley did not evaluate corporate expenditures specifically, nor did it rule out the possibility that a future Court might find otherwise. The opinion reasoned that an expenditure limitation covering only express advocacy (i.e., magic words) would likely be ineffectual, ibid., a problem that Congress tackled in BCRA, and it concluded that “the independent advocacy restricted by [FECA §608(e)(1)] does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large cam­ paign contributions,” id., at 46 (emphasis added). Buckley expressly contemplated that an anticorruption rationale might justify restrictions on independent expenditures at a later date, “because it may be that, in some circum­ stances, ‘large independent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions.’ ” WRTL, 551 U. S., at 478 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (quoting Buckley, 424 U. S., at 45). Certainly Buckley did not foreclose this possibility with respect to electioneering communications made with corporate general treasury funds, an issue the Court had no occasion to consider. The Austin Court did not rest its holding on quid pro