64
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
quo corruption, as it found the broader corruption impli
cated by the antidistortion and shareholder protection
rationales a sufficient basis for Michigan’s restriction on
corporate electioneering. 494 U. S., at 658–660. Concur
ring in that opinion, I took the position that “the danger of
either the fact, or the appearance, of quid pro quo rela
tionships [also] provides an adequate justification for state
regulation” of these independent expenditures. Id., at 678.
I did not see this position as inconsistent with Buckley’s
analysis of individual expenditures. Corporations, as a
class, tend to be more attuned to the complexities of the
legislative process and more directly affected by tax and
appropriations measures that receive little public scrutiny;
they also have vastly more money with which to try to buy
access and votes. See Supp. Brief for Appellee 17 (stating
that the Fortune 100 companies earned revenues of $13.1
trillion during the last election cycle). Business corpora
tions must engage the political process in instrumental
terms if they are to maximize shareholder value. The
unparalleled resources, professional lobbyists, and single
minded focus they bring to this effort, I believed, make
quid pro quo corruption and its appearance inherently
more likely when they (or their conduits or trade groups)
spend unrestricted sums on elections.
It is with regret rather than satisfaction that I can now
say that time has borne out my concerns. The legislative
and judicial proceedings relating to BCRA generated a
substantial body of evidence suggesting that, as corpora
tions grew more and more adept at crafting “issue ads” to
help or harm a particular candidate, these nominally
independent expenditures began to corrupt the political
process in a very direct sense. The sponsors of these ads
were routinely granted special access after the campaign
was over; “candidates and officials knew who their friends
were,” McConnell, 540 U. S., at 129. Many corporate
independent expenditures, it seemed, had become essen