Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010)
79
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
In short, regulations such as §203 and the statute up
held in Austin impose only a limited burden on First
Amendment freedoms not only because they target a
narrow subset of expenditures and leave untouched the
broader “public dialogue,” ante, at 25, but also because
they leave untouched the speech of natural persons.
Recognizing the weakness of a speaker-based critique of
Austin, the Court places primary emphasis not on the
corporation’s right to electioneer, but rather on the lis
tener’s interest in hearing what every possible speaker
may have to say. The Court’s central argument is that
laws such as §203 have “ ‘deprived [the electorate] of in
formation, knowledge and opinion vital to its function,’ ”
ante, at 38 (quoting CIO, 335 U. S., at 144 (Rutledge, J.,
concurring in judgment)), and this, in turn, “interferes
with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First
Amendment,” ante, at 38 (quoting New York State Bd. of
Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208 (2008)).
There are many flaws in this argument. If the overrid
ing concern depends on the interests of the audience,
surely the public’s perception of the value of corporate
speech should be given important weight. That perception
today is the same as it was a century ago when Theodore
Roosevelt delivered the speeches to Congress that, in time,
led to the limited prohibition on corporate campaign ex
penditures that is overruled today. See WRTL, 551 U. S.,
at 509–510 (Souter, J., dissenting) (summarizing President
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owners may speak in their own names, rather than the business’, if
they wish to evade §203 altogether. Nonprofit corporations that want
to make unrestricted electioneering expenditures may do so if they
refuse donations from businesses and unions and permit members to
disassociate without economic penalty. See MCFL, 479 U. S. 238, 264
(1986). Making it plain that their decision is not motivated by a con
cern about BCRA’s coverage of nonprofits that have ideological mis
sions but lack MCFL status, our colleagues refuse to apply the SnoweJeffords Amendment or the lower courts’ de minimis exception to
MCFL. See ante, at 10–12.