12 CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court true in the context of the First Amendment. As the Gov ernment stated, this case “would require a remand” to apply a de minimis standard. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39 (Sept. 9, 2009). Applying this standard would thus require case-by case determinations. But archetypical political speech would be chilled in the meantime. “ ‘First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.’ ” WRTL, supra, at 468–469 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963)). We decline to adopt an interpretation that requires intricate case-by-case deter minations to verify whether political speech is banned, especially if we are convinced that, in the end, this corpo ration has a constitutional right to speak on this subject. E As the foregoing analysis confirms, the Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U. S. 393, 403 (2007). It is not judicial restraint to accept an unsound, narrow argument just so the Court can avoid another argument with broader implications. In deed, a court would be remiss in performing its duties were it to accept an unsound principle merely to avoid the necessity of making a broader ruling. Here, the lack of a valid basis for an alternative ruling requires full consid eration of the continuing effect of the speech suppression upheld in Austin. Citizens United stipulated to dismissing count 5 of its complaint, which raised a facial challenge to §441b, even though count 3 raised an as-applied challenge. See App. 23a (count 3: “As applied to Hillary, [§441b] is unconstitu tional under the First Amendment guarantees of free expression and association”). The Government argues that Citizens United waived its challenge to Austin by dismissing count 5. We disagree.