30
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
Buckley Court did not invoke the First Amendment’s
overbreadth doctrine, see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U. S. 601, 615 (1973), to suggest that §608(e)’s expenditure
ban would have been constitutional if it had applied only
to corporations and not to individuals, 424 U. S., at 50.
Buckley cited with approval the Automobile Workers dis
sent, which argued that §610 was unconstitutional. 424
U. S., at 43 (citing 352 U. S., at 595–596 (opinion of Doug
las, J.)).
Notwithstanding this precedent, Congress recodified
§610’s corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U. S. C.
§441b four months after Buckley was decided. See 90 Stat.
490. Section 441b is the independent expenditure restric
tion challenged here.
Less than two years after Buckley, Bellotti, 435 U. S.
765, reaffirmed the First Amendment principle that the
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the
speaker’s corporate identity. Bellotti could not have been
clearer when it struck down a state-law prohibition on
corporate independent expenditures related to referenda
issues:
“We thus find no support in the First . . . Amend
ment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the proposi
tion that speech that otherwise would be within the
protection of the First Amendment loses that protec
tion simply because its source is a corporation that
cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material
effect on its business or property. . . . [That proposi
tion] amounts to an impermissible legislative prohibi
tion of speech based on the identity of the interests
that spokesmen may represent in public debate over
controversial issues and a requirement that the
speaker have a sufficiently great interest in the sub
ject to justify communication.
.
.
.
.
.