44
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribu
tion to, one candidate over another is that the candi
date will respond by producing those political out
comes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised
on responsiveness.” McConnell, 540 U. S., at 297
(opinion of KENNEDY, J.).
Reliance on a “generic favoritism or influence theory . . . is
at odds with standard First Amendment analyses because
it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle.”
Id., at 296.
The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will
not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By
definition, an independent expenditure is political speech
presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a
candidate. See Buckley, supra, at 46. The fact that a
corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend
money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the
people have the ultimate influence over elected officials.
This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the elector
ate will refuse “ ‘to take part in democratic governance’ ”
because of additional political speech made by a corpora
tion or any other speaker. McConnell, supra, at 144 (quot
ing Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S.
377, 390 (2000)).
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. ___ (2009),
is not to the contrary. Caperton held that a judge was
required to recuse himself “when a person with a personal
stake in a particular case had a significant and dispropor
tionate influence in placing the judge on the case by rais
ing funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when
the case was pending or imminent.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at
14). The remedy of recusal was based on a litigant’s due
process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge. See
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 46 (1975). Caperton’s
holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be