44 CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribu tion to, one candidate over another is that the candi date will respond by producing those political out comes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness.” McConnell, 540 U. S., at 297 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). Reliance on a “generic favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle.” Id., at 296. The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate. See Buckley, supra, at 46. The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected officials. This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the elector ate will refuse “ ‘to take part in democratic governance’ ” because of additional political speech made by a corpora tion or any other speaker. McConnell, supra, at 144 (quot ing Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 390 (2000)). Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. ___ (2009), is not to the contrary. Caperton held that a judge was required to recuse himself “when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and dispropor tionate influence in placing the judge on the case by rais ing funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14). The remedy of recusal was based on a litigant’s due process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 46 (1975). Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be

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