4
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
practice of avoiding unnecessary (and unnecessarily
broad) constitutional holdings somehow trumps our obli
gation faithfully to interpret the law. It should go without
saying, however, that we cannot embrace a narrow ground
of decision simply because it is narrow; it must also be
right. Thus while it is true that “[i]f it is not necessary to
decide more, it is necessary not to decide more,” post, at 14
(internal quotation marks omitted), sometimes it is neces
sary to decide more. There is a difference between judicial
restraint and judicial abdication. When constitutional
questions are “indispensably necessary” to resolving the
case at hand, “the court must meet and decide them.” Ex
parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11, 558) (CC Va.
1833) (Marshall, C. J.).
Because it is necessary to reach Citizens United’s
broader argument that Austin should be overruled, the
debate over whether to consider this claim on an as
applied or facial basis strikes me as largely beside the
point. Citizens United has standing—it is being injured
by the Government’s enforcement of the Act. Citizens
United has a constitutional claim—the Act violates the
First Amendment, because it prohibits political speech.
The Government has a defense—the Act may be enforced,
consistent with the First Amendment, against corpora
tions. Whether the claim or the defense prevails is the
question before us.
Given the nature of that claim and defense, it makes no
difference of any substance whether this case is resolved
by invalidating the statute on its face or only as applied to
Citizens United. Even if considered in as-applied terms, a
holding in this case that the Act may not be applied to
Citizens United—because corporations as well as indi
viduals enjoy the pertinent First Amendment rights—
would mean that any other corporation raising the same
challenge would also win. Likewise, a conclusion that the
Act may be applied to Citizens United—because it is