Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 5 ROBERTS, C. J., concurring constitutional to prohibit corporate political speech— would similarly govern future cases. Regardless whether we label Citizens United’s claim a “facial” or “as-applied” challenge, the consequences of the Court’s decision are the same.1 II The text and purpose of the First Amendment point in the same direction: Congress may not prohibit political speech, even if the speaker is a corporation or union. What makes this case difficult is the need to confront our prior decision in Austin. This is the first case in which we have been asked to overrule Austin, and thus it is also the first in which we have had reason to consider how much weight to give stare decisis in assessing its continued validity. The dissent erroneously declares that the Court “reaffirmed” Austin’s holding in subsequent cases—namely, Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146 (2003); McConnell; and WRTL. Post, at 48–50. Not so. Not a single party in any of those cases asked us to overrule Austin, and as the dissent points out, post, at 4–6, the Court generally does not consider constitutional arguments that have not prop erly been raised. Austin’s validity was therefore not di rectly at issue in the cases the dissent cites. The Court’s unwillingness to overturn Austin in those cases cannot be understood as a reaffirmation of that decision. A Fidelity to precedent—the policy of stare decisis—is vital —————— 1 The dissent suggests that I am “much too quick” to reach this con clusion because I “ignore” Citizens United’s narrower arguments. Post, at 13, n. 12. But in fact I do not ignore those arguments; on the con trary, I (and my colleagues in the majority) appropriately consider and reject them on their merits, before addressing Citizens United’s broader claims. Supra, at 2–3; ante, at 5–12.