Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010)
3
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
Court today rejects a century of history when it treats the
distinction between corporate and individual campaign
spending as an invidious novelty born of Austin v. Michi
gan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990). Relying
largely on individual dissenting opinions, the majority
blazes through our precedents, overruling or disavowing a
body of case law including FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (2007) (WRTL), McConnell v. FEC, 540
U. S. 93 (2003), FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146 (2003),
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238
(1986) (MCFL), NRWC, 459 U. S. 197, and California
Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182 (1981).
In his landmark concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U. S. 288, 346 (1936), Justice Brandeis stressed the impor
tance of adhering to rules the Court has “developed . . . for
its own governance” when deciding constitutional ques
tions. Because departures from those rules always en
hance the risk of error, I shall review the background of
this case in some detail before explaining why the Court’s
analysis rests on a faulty understanding of Austin and
McConnell and of our campaign finance jurisprudence
more generally .1 I regret the length of what follows, but
the importance and novelty of the Court’s opinion require
a full response. Although I concur in the Court’s decision
to sustain BCRA’s disclosure provisions and join Part IV
of its opinion, I emphatically dissent from its principal
holding.
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1 Specifically, Part I, infra, at 4–17, addresses the procedural history
of the case and the narrower grounds of decision the majority has
bypassed. Part II, infra, at 17–23, addresses stare decisis. Part III,
infra, at 23–56, addresses the Court’s assumptions that BCRA “bans”
corporate speech, that identity-based distinctions may not be drawn in
the political realm, and that Austin and McConnell were outliers in our
First Amendment tradition. Part IV, infra, at 56–89, addresses the
Court’s treatment of the anticorruption, antidistortion, and shareholder
protection rationales for regulating corporate electioneering.