4 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN J., concurringpart KAVANAUGH KAVANAUGH , J., ,concurring and geographically compact minority populations. See Abbott, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1006–1007, 1020 (1994); Voinovich, 507 U. S., at 153–154; see generally Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 22) (“§2 does not demand proof of discriminatory purpose”); Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U. S. 471, 482 (1997) (Congress “clearly expressed its desire that §2 not have an intent component”); Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 923–924 (1994) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (§2 adopts a “ ‘results’ test, rather than an ‘intent’ test”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S. 380, 394, 404 (1991) (“proof of intent is no longer required to prove a §2 violation” as “Congress made clear that a violation of §2 could be established by proof of discriminatory results alone”); Gingles, 478 U. S., at 71, n. 34 (plurality opinion) (§2 does not require “ ‘purpose of racial discrimination’ ”). Fourth, Alabama asserts that §2, as construed by Gingles to require race-based redistricting in certain circumstances, exceeds Congress’s remedial or preventive authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. As the Court explains, the constitutional argument presented by Alabama is not persuasive in light of the Court’s precedents. See ante, at 33–34; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 177–178 (1980). JUSTICE THOMAS notes, however, that even if Congress in 1982 could constitutionally authorize race-based redistricting under §2 for some period of time, the authority to conduct race-based redistricting cannot extend indefinitely into the future. See post, at 44–45 (dissenting opinion). But Alabama did not raise that temporal argument in this Court, and I therefore would not consider it at this time. For those reasons, I vote to affirm, and I concur in all but Part III–B–1 of the Court’s opinion.