Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
5
Syllabus
would “revise and reformulate the Gingles threshold inquiry that has
been the baseline of [the Court’s] §2 jurisprudence” for decades. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U. S. 1, 16 (plurality opinion). Pp. 15–18.
(2) Alabama argues that absent a benchmark, the Gingles framework ends up requiring the racial proportionality in districting that
§2(b) forbids. The Court’s decisions implementing §2 demonstrate,
however, that when properly applied, the Gingles framework itself imposes meaningful constraints on proportionality. See Shaw v. Reno,
509 U. S. 630, 633–634; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 906; Bush v.
Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 957 (plurality opinion). In Shaw v. Reno, for example, the Court considered the permissibility of a second majorityminority district in North Carolina, which at the time had 12 seats in
the U. S. House of Representatives and a 20% black voting age population. 509 U. S., at 633–634. Though North Carolina believed §2 required a second majority-minority district, the Court found North Carolina’s approach an impermissible racial gerrymander because the
State had “concentrated a dispersed minority population in a single
district by disregarding traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions.” Id., at 647.
The Court’s decisions in Bush and Shaw similarly declined to require additional majority-minority districts under §2 where those districts did not satisfy traditional districting principles.
The Court recognizes that reapportionment remains primarily the
duty and responsibility of the States, not the federal courts. Section 2
thus never requires adoption of districts that violate traditional redistricting principles and instead limits judicial intervention to “those instances of intensive racial politics” where the “excessive role [of race]
in the electoral process . . . den[ies] minority voters equal opportunity
to participate.” S. Rep. No. 97–417, pp. 33–34. Pp. 18–22.
(c) To apply its race-neutral benchmark in practice, Alabama would
require plaintiffs to make at least three showings. First, Alabama
would require §2 plaintiffs to show that the illustrative maps adduced
for the first Gingles precondition are not based on race. Alabama
would next graft onto §2 a requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate, at
the totality of circumstances stage, that the State’s enacted plan contains fewer majority-minority districts than what an “average” raceneutral plan would contain. And finally, Alabama would have plaintiffs prove that any deviation between the State’s plan and a race-neutral plan is explainable “only” by race. The Court declines to adopt any
of these novel requirements.
Here, Alabama contends that because HB1 sufficiently “resembles”
the “race-neutral” maps created by the State’s experts—all of which
lack two majority-black districts—HB1 does not violate §2. Alabama’s
reliance on the maps created by its experts Dr. Duchin and Dr. Imai is