Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 31 Opinion of the Court In doing so, we have unanimously held that §2 and Gingles “[c]ertainly . . . apply” to claims challenging single-member districts. Growe, 507 U. S., at 40. And we have even invalidated portions of a State’s single-district map under §2. See LULAC, 548 U. S., at 427–429. 9 Alabama’s approach would require “abandoning” this precedent, “overruling the interpretation of §2” as set out in nearly a dozen of our cases. Holder, 512 U. S., at 944 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). We decline to take that step. Congress is undoubtedly aware of our construing §2 to apply to districting challenges. It can change that if it likes. But until and unless it does, statutory stare decisis counsels our staying the course. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015). 10 The statutory text in any event supports the conclusion that §2 applies to single-member districts. Alabama’s own proffered definition of a “procedure is the manner or method —————— 9 The dissent suggests that Growe does not support the proposition that §2 applies to single-member redistricting. Post, at 4–5 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). The Court has understood Growe much differently. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U. S. 74, 90 (1997) (“Our decision in [Gingles] set out the basic framework for establishing a vote dilution claim against at-large, multimembers districts; we have since extended the framework to single-member districts.” (citing Growe, 507 U. S., at 40– 41)); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1006 (1994) (“In Growe, we held that a claim of vote dilution in a single-member district requires proof meeting the same three threshold conditions for a dilution challenge to a multimember district . . . .”); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U. S. 1, 12 (plurality opinion) (“The Court later held that the three Gingles requirements apply equally in §2 cases involving single-member districts . . . .” (citing Growe, 507 U. S., at 40–41)). 10 JUSTICE ALITO argues that “[t]he Gingles framework should be [re]interpreted” in light of changing methods in statutory interpretation. Post, at 10 (dissenting opinion). But as we have explained, Gingles effectuates the delicate legislative bargain that §2 embodies. And statutory stare decisis counsels strongly in favor of not “undo[ing] . . . the compromise that was reached between the House and Senate when §2 was amended in 1982.” Brnovich, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22).