OCTOBER TERM, 1961.
Opinion of the Court.
369 U. S.
quences of judicial action. For example, though a court
will not ordinarily inquire whether a treaty has been terminated, since on that question "governmental action...
must be regarded as of controlling importance," if there
has been no conclusive "governmental action" then a court
can construe a treaty and may find it provides the answer.
Compare Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. 3. 270, 285, with
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign
Parts v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 492-495." Though
a court will not undertake to construe a treaty in a
manner inconsistent with a subsequent federal statute,
no similar hesitancy obtains if the asserted clash is with
state law. Compare Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S.
190, with Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 187.
While recognition of foreign governments so strongly
defies judicial treatment that without executive recognition a foreign state has been called "a republic of whose
existence we know nothing," "5and the judiciary ordinarily follows the executive as to which nation has sovereignty over disputed territory,3 once sovereignty over an
area is politically determined and declared, courts may
examine the resulting status and decide independently
whether a statute applies to that area."' Similarly, recognition of belligerency abroad is an executive responsibility, but if the executive proclamations fall short of
an explicit answer, a court may construe them seeking,
for example, to determine whether the situation is such.
that statutes designed to assure American neutrality have
34
And see Clark v. Allen, 331 U. S. 503.
35 United States v. Klintock, 5 Wheat. 144, 149; see also United
States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 634-635.
36
Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307; and see Williams v.
Suffolk Insurance Co., 13 Pet. 415, 420.
31 Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377, 380; De Lima V.
Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 180-200.