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190 OCTOBER TERM, 1961. Opinion of the Court. 369 U. S. in compliance with the constitutional scheme was effected by the General Assembly each decade from 1871 to 1901. The 1871 apportionment 1 was preceded by an 1870 statute requiring an enumeration.' The 1881 apportionment involved three statutes, the first authorizing an enumeration, the second enlarging the Senate from 25 to the several counties to select a Commissioner to enumerate "all the male inhabitants of their respective counties, who are twenty-one years of age and upward, who ihall be resident citizens'of their counties on the first day of January, 1871 . . . ." Reports compiled in the several counties on this basis were submitted to the General Assembly by the Secretary of State and were used in the first apportionment. Appendix to Tenn. S. J., 1871, 41-43. Yet such figures would not reflect the numbers of persons qualified to exercise the franchise under the thengoverning qualifications: (a) citizenship; (b) residence in the State 12 months, and in the county 6 months; (c) payment of poll taxes for the preceding year unless entitled to exemption. Acts of 1870 (2d Sess.), c. 10. (These qualifications continued at least until after 1901. See Shan. Tenn. Code Ann., §§ 1167, 1220 (1896; Supp. 1904).) Still, when the General Assembly directed the Secretary of State to do all he could to obtain complete reports from the counties, the Resolution spoke broadly of "the impossibility of ... [redistricting] without the census returns of the voting population from each county . .. . Tenn. S. J., 1871, 46-47, 96. The figures also showed a correlation with Federal Census figures for 1870. The Census reported 259,016 male citizens 21 and upward in Tennessee. Ninth Census of the United States, 1870, Statistics of the Population 635 (1872). The Tennessee Secretary of State's Report, with 15 counties not reported, gave a figure of 237,431. Using the numbers of actual votes in the last gubernatorial election for those 15 counties, the Secretary arrived at a total of 250,025. Appendix to Tenn. S. J., 1871, 41-43. This and subsequent history indicate continued reference to Census figures and finally in 1901, abandonment of a state enumeration in favor of the use of Census figures. See notes 7, 8, 9, infra. See also Williams, Legislative Apportionment in Tennessee, 20 Tenn. L. Rev. 235, 236, n. 6. It would therefore appear that unless there is a contrary showing at the trial, appellants' current figures, taken from the United States Census Reports, are apposite. 5Acts of 1871 (1st Sess.), c..146. 6 Acts of 1870 (Ist Sess.), c. 107.

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Baker v. Carr

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether a claim alleging that a state's legislative apportionment scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment — by diluting the voting power of citizens in overpopulated districts — presents a justiciable controversy or is a non-justiciable "political question" that federal courts lack authority to adjudicate. This issue required the Court to revisit and overturn the precedent of Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), which had held that federal courts should not intervene in reapportionment disputes.

Alleged Acts: Tennessee had not reapportioned its state legislative districts since 1901, despite a constitutional requirement to do so every ten years and despite dramatic population shifts over the intervening decades. By the 1960s, the state's legislative districts were severely malapportioned: some districts had populations over ten times larger than others, meaning rural voters were vastly overrepresented while urban voters were underrepresented. For example, a voter in a rural district had roughly ten times the voting power of a voter in an urban district like Memphis or Nashville. A group of Tennessee voters, led by Charles Baker (a Republican voter from Shelby County), sued Joe Carr, the Tennessee Secretary of State, in federal court. Baker alleged that the failure to reapportion violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by diluting the votes of urban residents. The suit sought to have the apportionment declared unconstitutional and to compel the state to reapportion.

Procedural history: The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that reapportionment was a non-justiciable political question beyond the authority of federal courts.

Summary: Baker v. Carr is one of the most consequential constitutional law decisions of the twentieth century. The Supreme Court held for the first time that challenges to state legislative apportionment under the Equal Protection Clause are justiciable — they do not present non-justiciable political questions. By ruling that federal courts have the authority to review and remedy malapportionment, the Court overturned the prior precedent of Colegrove v. Green (1946) and opened the door to the "reapportionment revolution" of the 1960s. The decision established that the Equal Protection Clause provides judicially manageable standards for evaluating vote dilution claims, and that voters whose votes are diluted by malapportioned districts have standing to sue. The case laid the constitutional foundation for the "one person, one vote" doctrine, which was formally articulated two years later in Reynolds v. Sims (1964). Together, Baker and Reynolds transformed American democracy by requiring legislative districts to be drawn based on substantially equal population, ending the rural-dominated legislatures that had persisted for decades despite massive urban population growth.

Conclusion: In a 6–2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's dismissal and held that legislative apportionment challenges under the Equal Protection Clause are justiciable — they do not present non-justiciable political questions. The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause provides a judicially manageable standard for evaluating apportionment claims, distinguishing them from cases involving the Guaranty Clause (Article IV, § 4), which had been held non-justiciable in Luther v. Borden. The Court explained that unlike the Guaranty Clause — which involves questions of republican government that lack judicially manageable standards — Equal Protection claims are governed by familiar and well-developed legal standards. The Court identified six characteristics of political questions (textual commitment to another branch, lack of judicially manageable standards, inability to decide without a policy determination, etc.) and concluded that none applied to Equal Protection apportionment claims. The Court emphasized that the claim was not based on the Guaranty Clause but on the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides an independent constitutional basis for judicial review.

Legal Issue(s)

Electoral Maps and Districting
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Fourteenth Amendment and Article III of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Mar 26, 1962

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep369/usrep369186/usrep369186.pdf

Primary Documents

Baker v. Carr.pdf
English
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Election Judgments - IFES

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Baker v. Carr

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