Guide on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 – Right to free elections specific judicial decision will not in itself entail a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) [GC], 2012, § 102). 28. In Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], 2005, the Court found a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 because the voting ban in question had been a blanket ban applied automatically to anyone serving a custodial sentence. It affected 48,000 prisoners, which was a high number, and concerned all sorts of prison sentences, ranging from one day to life, and for various types of offences from the most minor to the most serious. In addition, there was no direct link between the offence committed by an individual and the withdrawal of his voting rights. The Court also found a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in the case of Söyler v. Turkey, 2013, where restrictions imposed on the voting rights of convicted persons had an even broader scope and impact because they even applied to those who were not, or no longer, serving time in prison. In Frodl v. Austria, 2010, the deprivation of voting rights did not systematically affect all prisoners, but only those who had been sentenced to prison for more than a year for an offence committed voluntarily. Nevertheless, there was no link between the automatic imposition of the measure and the conduct of the individual or the circumstances of the case. The Court thus found that the voting ban was not proportionate to the aims pursued. 29. In Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) [GC], 2012, however, the Court examined a voting ban which applied only to persons convicted of certain well-determined offences or to a custodial sentence exceeding a statutory threshold. The legislature had been careful to adjust the duration of this measure according to the specific features of each case. It had also adjusted the duration of the ban depending on the sentence imposed and therefore, indirectly, on the gravity of the sentence. Many of the convicted prisoners had retained the possibility of voting in legislative elections. In addition, this system had been complemented by the possibility for convicts affected by a permanent ban to recover their voting rights. The Italian system was not therefore marked by excessive rigidity. The Court thus held that there had been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. 30. It must nevertheless be noted that for a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to be found, prisoners must show that they have actually been prevented from voting. It is not sufficient for them to rely on their state of detention alone, because events such as early release or admission to a psychiatric institution, etc., may take place before the date of the elections in question. Such applications are thus declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded (Dunn and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2014). 31. Moreover, the Court has never found it appropriate to indicate to States the necessary measures to be taken in order to put an end to violations caused by a prisoner voting ban. At best it has set out a timetable (Greens and M.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 120). However, States cannot rely on the complexity of making changes to the law which led to the violation. In Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, 2013, the Court took note of the argument that the prohibition had been imposed by a provision of the Constitution which could not be amended by Parliament and could only be revised by adopting a new Constitution, thus implying a particularly complex procedure. However, it pointed out that it was essentially for the authorities to choose, under the supervision of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, the means to be used to bring the legislation into conformity with the Convention. It is open to governments to explore all possible avenues to ensure compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, including by a form of political process or by interpreting the Constitution in conformity with the Convention (§ 111). 32. Lastly, in Moohan and Gillon v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2017, convicted prisoners had complained of being unable to vote in the Scottish independence referendum held in 2014. Finding that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 was inapplicable to such a consultation, the Court dismissed their applications as inadmissible. European Court of Human Rights 10/35 Last update: 30.04.2021