Guide on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 – Right to free elections the Court does not overlook the complexity or the features specific to each State. As a result, a broad margin of appreciation is also afforded to States in this connection. 59. The Court has taken the view, in particular, that the proper management of electoral rolls is a pre-condition for a free and fair ballot. The effectiveness of the right to stand for election is undoubtedly contingent upon the fair exercise of the right to vote. The mismanagement of an electoral roll could diminish the candidates’ chances of standing equally and fairly for election (Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, 2008, §§ 82-83). In a case where the rules for the compilation of electoral rolls had been changed unexpectedly just one month before the election, the Court accepted that the new system of registration was not perfect but attached greater importance to the fact that the authorities had not spared any effort to make the new ballot fairer. In particular, the electoral authorities had had the challenge of remedying manifest shortcomings in the electoral rolls within very tight deadlines, in a “post-revolutionary” political situation, and it would thus have been an excessive and impracticable burden to expect an ideal solution from the authorities. It was up to the electors to verify that they were registered and to request any correction if necessary. The Court found that this fell within the State’s margin of appreciation (ibid.). 1. Guaranteeing serious candidatures: the deposit requirement 60. The electoral laws of a number of States provide for the payment of a deposit by candidates to discourage frivolous candidatures. Such measures enhance the responsibility of those standing for election and confine elections to serious candidates, whilst avoiding any unreasonable outlay of public funds. They may therefore pursue the legitimate aim of guaranteeing the right to effective, streamlined representation (Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine, 2006, §§ 61-62). 61. The amount of the deposit must nevertheless remain proportionate, such that it strikes a balance between, on the one hand, deterring frivolous candidates, and, on the other, allowing the registration of serious candidates. The Court thus takes into account the amount of the sum involved, the electoral campaign services provided by the State and the other burdensome costs of organising elections which such deposits may help to allay. 62. For the proportionality test to be satisfied, the deposit required cannot be considered to have been excessive or to constitute an insurmountable administrative or financial barrier for a determined candidate wishing to enter the electoral race, and even less an obstacle to the emergence of sufficiently representative political currents or an interference with the principle of pluralism (Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine, 2006, §§ 72-73). The requirement to pay an election deposit, and provisions making reimbursement of the deposit and/or campaigning expenses conditional on the party’s having obtained a certain percentage of votes, serve to promote sufficiently representative currents of thought and are justified and proportionate under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation afforded to the Contracting States in this matter (Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia, 2007, § 94). This remains true even where the deposit cannot be refunded (Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine, 2006). However, the question whether or not a deposit can be refunded may raise questions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia, 2007, the Court found that the domestic procedure whereby the entire list of a party had been annulled on account of incorrect information having been given by certain candidates had breached the principle of legal certainty. The applicant party had already paid the election deposit. In view of its finding under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court took the view that a refusal to return that sum breached Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 2. Avoiding excessive fragmentation of the political landscape 63. Conditions concerning the number of signatures required for the presentation of a list of candidates do not constitute an impediment to the expression of the opinion of the people in the European Court of Human Rights 17/35 Last update: 30.04.2021