Guide on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 – Right to free elections legislature. The Courd held that the sitting had been convened pursuant to a law provisionally suspended by the Constitutional Court, and therefore in a manner manifestly at variance with the decisions of that court, which had been aimed at protecting the constitutional order. Consequently, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 did not apply. 5. The Court has held that the inability to receive the results of opinion polls on voting intentions over a period of two weeks prior to an election did not affect voters sufficiently “directly” for them to claim to be “victims” of a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention (Dimitras and Others v. Greece (dec.), 2017, §§ 30-32). 6. As regards presidential elections, the Court has taken the view that the powers of the Head of State cannot as such be construed as a form of “legislature” within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. It does not exclude, however, the possibility of applying Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to presidential elections. Should it be established that the office of the Head of State in question had been given the power to initiate and adopt legislation or enjoyed wide powers to control the passage of legislation or the power to censure the principal legislation-setting authorities, then it could arguably be considered to be a “legislature” within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (Boškoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2004; Brito Da Silva Guerra and Sousa Magno v. Portugal (dec.), 2008). This possibility has never been used, however, and has not even been mentioned in subsequent cases (Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011; Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 55-56). 7. The Court has, on a number of occasions, taken the view that the European Parliament forms part of the “legislature” within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], 1999, §§ 45-54; Occhetto v. Italy (dec.), 2013, § 42). 8. As to the actual features of elections, the text of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 provides only that they should be free and by secret ballot, as the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) and then the Court have constantly reiterated (X. v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 6 October 1976). The provision further makes it clear that elections must be held at reasonable intervals. The States have a broad margin of appreciation in such matters. The case-law nevertheless provides the following guidelines: “The Commission finds that the question whether elections are held at reasonable intervals must be determined by reference to the purpose of parliamentary elections. That purpose is to ensure that fundamental changes in prevailing public opinion are reflected in the opinions of the representatives of the people. Parliament must in principle be in a position to develop and execute its legislative intentions – including longer term legislative plans. Too short an interval between elections may impede political planning for the implementation of the will of the electorate; too long an interval can lead to the petrification of political groupings in Parliament which may no longer bear any resemblance to the prevailing will of the electorate.” (Timke v. Germany, Commission decision, 1995) 9. The case-law has continued to develop the requirement of universal suffrage, which is now the benchmark principle (X. v. Germany, Commission decision, 1967; Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], 2005, §§ 59 and 62; Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 1987, § 51). However, while Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 includes the principle of equality of treatment of all citizens in the exercise of their right to vote, it does not follow, however, that all votes must necessarily carry equal weight as regards the outcome of the election. Thus no electoral system can eliminate “wasted votes” (ibid., § 54; Partija “Jaunie Demokrāti” and Partija “Mūsu Zeme” v. Latvia (dec.), 2007). 10. However, the vote of each elector must have the possibility of affecting the composition of the legislature, otherwise the right to vote, the electoral process and, ultimately, the democratic order itself, would be devoid of substance (Riza and Others v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 148). States thus enjoy a broad margin of appreciation in the organisation of the ballot. An electoral boundary review giving rise to constituencies of unequal population does not breach Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 provided that the free will of the people is accurately reflected (Bompard v. France (dec.), 2006). Lastly, the European Court of Human Rights 6/35 Last update: 30.04.2021