Guide on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 – Right to free elections electoral rules from one country to another but also to explaining any evolution in the level of requirement depending on the period under consideration. 17. Lastly, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 covers the post-election period, including the counting of votes and the recording and transmission of the results. The State thus has a positive obligation to ensure careful regulation of the process in which the results of voting are ascertained, processed and recorded (Davydov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 284-285). II. Active aspect: the right to vote 18. The “active” aspect is subject to limitations. Here, as in any other area under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation which varies depending on the context. It is, for example, possible to fix a minimum age to ensure that individuals taking part in the electoral process are sufficiently mature (Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], 2005, § 62). 19. However, the supervision exercised consists in a relatively comprehensive review of proportionality. The margin of appreciation afforded to States cannot have the effect of prohibiting certain individuals or groups from taking part in the political life of the country, especially through the appointment of members of the legislature (Aziz v. Cyprus, 2004, § 28; Tănase v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 158). In Aziz v. Cyprus, 2004, the Court ruled on the inability for members of the TurkishCypriot community to vote in legislative elections. It took the view that, on account of the abnormal situation existing in Cyprus since 1963 and the legislative vacuum, the applicant, as a member of the Turkish-Cypriot community living in the Republic of Cyprus, was completely deprived of any opportunity to express his opinion in the choice of the members of the House of Representatives. The very essence of the applicant’s right to vote was thus impaired. The Court also found a clear inequality of treatment in the enjoyment of the right in question, between the members of the Turkish-Cypriot community and those of the Greek-Cypriot community. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. 20. It should also be noted that complaints concerning elections not falling under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 may, if appropriate, be raised under other Articles of the Convention. Thus, in Mółka v. Poland, 2006, the applicant was unable to vote in elections to municipal councils, district councils and regional assemblies. The polling station was not accessible to individuals in wheelchairs and it was not permitted to take ballot papers outside the premises. The Court took the view that it could not be excluded that the authorities’ failure to provide appropriate access to the polling station for the applicant, who wished to lead an active life, might have aroused feelings of humiliation and distress capable of impinging on his personal autonomy, and thereby on the quality of his private life. The Court thus accepted the idea that, in such circumstances, Article 8 was engaged. A. Loss of civic rights 21. When an individual or group has been deprived of the right to vote, the Court is particularly attentive. Deprivation of the right to vote must then pursue a legitimate aim but also pass a more stringent proportionality test. The Court has thus had occasion to examine a number of cases in which the deprivation of voting rights was part of a criminal investigation. The case of Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, concerned the automatic temporary loss of civic rights imposed on an individual suspected of belonging to the mafia. The Court agreed that the measure pursued a legitimate aim. However, taking into account the fact that the measure had only been applied after the applicant’s acquittal, it found that it had been disproportionate as there was no actual basis on which to suspect him of belonging to the mafia. In Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, the applicant had also been deprived of his right to vote for a limited period on account of his placement under police surveillance. However, more than nine months had passed between the order placing him under European Court of Human Rights 8/35 Last update: 30.04.2021