Guide on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 – Right to free elections eliminating frivolous candidates. However, in Danis and Association of Ethnic Turks v. Romania, 2015, the law imposing the additional criterion had been enacted just a few months before the elections, with the result that it had been objectively impossible for the applicants to fulfil it. In Cegolea v. Romania, 2020, the procedure for obtaining the additional criterion did not afford sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness, and lacked effective judicial scrutiny over discretionary powers of the executive authorities. 75. Finally, a sudden and unforeseeable change in the rules for calculating votes might infringe Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The Court found a violation of that Article as regards MPs deprived of their seats following an unpredictable departure by the Special Supreme Court from its settled caselaw concerning the calculation of the electoral quotient. In particular, it took account of the fact that the change in case-law, after the elections, had changed the meaning and weight given to blank ballot papers and that it had therefore been liable to alter the will of the electorate as expressed in the ballot box. It had also created a disparity in the manner in which sitting MPs had been elected (Paschalidis, Koutmeridis and Zaharakis v. Greece, 2008). D. Other legitimate aims 76. Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not contain a list of legitimate aims capable of justifying restrictions on the exercise of the rights that it guarantees. Nor does it refer to the “legitimate aims” listed exhaustively in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. As a result the Contracting Parties are entitled to rely on other aims, provided that the compatibility of that aim with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention is proved in the particular circumstances (Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], 2006, § 115). 77. The Court has thus made a distinction between loyalty towards the State and loyalty towards the government. While the need to ensure loyalty towards the State may constitute a legitimate aim justifying restrictions of electoral rights, that is not the case for loyalty towards the government (Tănase v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 166). Similarly, the obligation to have sufficient knowledge of the official language may pursue a legitimate aim (Podkolzina v. Latvia, 2002). The Court has also found that the obligation imposed on candidates in a parliamentary election to submit accurate information on their employment and party membership served to enable voters to make an informed choice with regard to the candidate’s professional and political background and thus constituted a legitimate aim (Krasnov and Skuratov v. Russia, 2007). By contrast, a candidate’s ineligibility founded solely on an allegedly defective form of a document provided by him was not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (ibid., §§ 65-66). 78. The Court also declared inadmissible an application complaining about an obligation for a very traditional Protestant party to open its lists of candidates to women. It found that the progression towards gender equality in the member States precluded the State from supporting the idea that the woman’s role was secondary to that of the man (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2012). 79. Moreover, in Melnychenko v. Ukraine, 2004, the applicant, a Ukrainian national who had refugee status in the USA, had had his candidature for election to the Ukrainian parliament refused on the ground that he had provided false information about his residence. In accordance with the legislation in force, he had given information from his internal passport, which he still possessed, showing that he lived in Ukraine. The Court agreed that it could be acceptable to impose a residence condition for the registration of candidatures. However, it noted that the applicant had complied with domestic law, which did not require continuous residence in the country. In addition, he was in a situation where he could either stay in Ukraine and face a threat of bodily harm, which would have made it impossible for him to exercise his political rights, or leave the country and no longer qualify to stand for election. The Court thus found there had been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. European Court of Human Rights 20/35 Last update: 30.04.2021