63 dialogue between the Commission, the Registrar of political parties and the political parties themselves be nurtured in order to avoid any suspicions that the process is not being undertaken in a free, fair and transparent [manner] and that the system being administered is not impartial, neutral, efficient, accurate and accountable. An electoral process must not only meet the constitutional and legal threshold but ought to carry with it the confidence of the electorates. This in my view can only be achieved in a process where all the players are afforded a forum at which to air their grievances collectively and individually and in my view this is where the Political Parties Liaison Committee comes in. 3.4.2 The technology deployed in elections must be ‘accessible and inclusive for all citizens, including persons with disabilities and persons with special needs, to participate in the election process’ (Regulation 4(2), Elections (Technology) Regulations, 2017). Further, the IEBC must carry out regular inspections and servicing of election technology, to ensure the serviceability, reliability and availability (Regulation 6, Elections (Technology) Regulations, 2017). 3.4.3 The IEBC secretariat cannot procure electoral materials or technology when there are vacancies in all the offices of IEBC Commissioners. The rationale for this rule is that the Commissioners must ratify the secretariat’s decisions before they can be attributed to the IEBC. In Republic v IEBC & 3 Others ex parte Coalition for Reforms and Democracy, Nairobi High Court Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 637 of 2016, the Court explained the rationale for the rule as follows: …under the Constitution and the legislation, the foundation of the powers of the Secretariat is the existence of the Commission. The Secretary and the Secretariat can only carry out the powers vested in their offices when the Commission is in place exercising its powers since they implement what the Commission has resolved upon… The outcome of the tasks undertaken by the Commission’s staff must be ratified by the Commissioners if they are to be deemed as the decisions of the Commission. 3.4.4 A person who is neither a candidate nor a tenderer in a procurement undertaken by the IEBC, and hence has no right of recourse to the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board, may move to the High Court by way of judicial review or constitutional petition if they feel that the procurement does not meet the threshold of fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness set out in Article 227 of the Constitution (Republic v IEBC & 3 Others ex parte Coalition for Reforms and Democracy, Nairobi High Court Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 637 of 2016). The basis for this rule lies in the constitutional provisions giving ‘every person’ the obligation and/or right to respect, uphold, defend and institute court proceedings claiming that the Constitution has been contravened or is threatened with contravention (Articles 3(1) and 258(1) of the Constitution). 3.4.5 Courts will not usually invoke the public interest or public policy as a basis for upholding a procurement that violates the Constitution or other applicable laws (Republic v IEBC & 3 Others ex parte Coalition for Reforms and Democracy, Nairobi High Court Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 637 of 2016). Consequently, they may nullify a procurement that violates the Constitution, even where the effect of such a decision is to jeopardise the holding of an election and, arguably, hurt the public interest. In Republic v IEBC & 3 Others ex parte Coalition for Reforms and Democracy, Nairobi High Court Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 637 of 2016, the Court explained the rationale for nullifying such a procurement (i.e., one that does not align with the public interest) in the following words: There can never be public interest in breach of the law, and the decision of the respondent is indefensible on public interest because public interest must accord to the Constitution and the law as the rule of law is one of the national values of the BENCH BOOK ON ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION