39 Further, in explaining this position, the Court in The Party of National Unity v Dennis Mugendi & 3 Others, Nairobi High Court Election Petition Appeal No. 1 of 2017, distinguished the various levels of nomination as being: nomination at the party level (party primaries (now party nominations)), nomination at the IEBC level (i.e., presentation of party nominees), and nomination under Article 90 of the Constitution (IEBC’s receipt of party lists). The Court found that the Constitution’s intention was that only the IEBC would have jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising out of the IEBC level processes, and political parties were responsible for their own internal governance issues, with possible appeal to the PPDT and thereafter to the High Court. This was captured in the Memorandum of Understanding between IEBC and PPDT of March 2017. 2.4.2.7. The jurisdiction of the IEBC vis-à-vis the PPDT on nomination matters was more succinctly addressed in the case of Republic v IEBC & 2 Ex Parte Wavinya Ndeti, Nairobi Miscellaneous Application 301 of 2017, where the High Court opined that: It was contended that the 3rd interested party ought to have lodged his complaint with the Party’s Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism first and as this was not done the Committee had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. In my view the IEBC Committee exercises original jurisdiction under section 74 of the Elections Act unlike the Political Party Dispute Tribunal which exercises an appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, in matters which purely fall within section 74 of the Elections Act and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the IEBC Committee, it is my view that the Committee is not deprived of jurisdiction by the mere fact that the complainant did not lodge his complaint with the Party’s Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Whereas the PPDT and the IEBC have jurisdiction over electoral disputes, the Court must interpret their jurisdiction in a manner that does not render one statutory tribunal redundant. The Court must in such matters adopt a purposive interpretation of the respective electoral statutes. Therefore to interpret their jurisdiction in a manner that gives leeway to parties to either bypass one or ignore decisions made by the other would militate against the purpose for which the two Tribunals were set up. It is now clear that the PPDT deals with disputes arising from party primaries and this is clear from its jurisdiction. The IEBC on the other hand, it is my view, deals with nomination disputes that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the PPDT since appeals from the PPDT do not lie to the IEBC but to the High Court. If it were the position that the IEBC Committee would be free to determine issues which had already been determined by the PPDT without an appeal being preferred to the High Court, that position would amount to elevating the IEBC to an appellate Tribunal over the decisions of the PPDT. That scenario would also imply that even where a decision of the PPDT has been the subject of the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the IEBC might still be at liberty to entertain such a matter under the guise of resolving a nomination dispute. To my mind that would clearly be contrary to the principle of judicial hierarchy and would be incongruous to the statutory scheme and subversive of the true legislative intent. If it were so, the legislative intent would have been devoid of concept of purpose. Where however the matter does not fall within the jurisdiction of the PPDT, the IEBC must be the first port of call as long as its jurisdiction is not excluded under section 74 of the Elections Act. To that end the issue of double jeopardy would not arise. 2.4.2.8. However, the Court of Appeal has asserted that the jurisdiction of the IEBC and PPDT concerning nominations remains concurrent (Fredrick Odhiambo Oyugi v Orange Democratic Movement & 2 Others, Civil Appeal No 199 of 2017, and that the obligation of the IEBC in relation to party nominations cannot be ousted by the MoU between the two institutions. The appellate Court stated at para 29: BENCH BOOK ON ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION