147 usually have sprung from the judgment and hence obsession with the decree only serves to obfuscate the substantive issues between the parties. 4.11.5 Once an appellant has filed the memorandum and record of appeal, it is the responsibility of the High Court to set in motion processes to ensure that the appeal is heard and determined expeditiously (Mwathethe Adamson Kadenge v Twahir Abdulkarim Mohamed & 2 Others, Mombasa High Court Civil Appeal No. 153 of 2013). The High Court must determine EDR appeals lodged before it within 6 months of the date of the lodging of the appeal (s. 75(4) of the Elections Act, 2011; Mwathethe Adamson Kadenge v Twahir Abdulkarim Mohamed & 2 Others, Mombasa High Court Civil Appeal No. 153 of 2013). 4.11.6 In Mwathethe Adamson Kadenge v Twahir Abdulkarim Mohamed & 2 Others, Mombasa High Court Civil Appeal No. 153 of 2013, it was held that the High Court ceases to have jurisdiction upon the expiry of the six-month period, irrespective of who is to blame for the delay. In Mary Wairimu Muraguri & 12 Others v IEBC & 5 Others, Nyeri High Court Election Appeal No. 30 of 2014, it was held that the High Court can hear and determine the appeal even after the expiry of six months, especially where the delay has been occasioned by the reorganisation of the court or other factors beyond the control of the parties. 4.11.7 The conflict between these two positions may arguably be resolved by the decision in Evans Odhiambo Kidero & 4 Others v Ferdinand Ndung’u Waititu & 4 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. 18 of 2014, in which it was held that the constitutional imperative of timely resolution of electoral disputes deprived the Court of Appeal of the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed outside prescribed statutory timelines, even where the delay was occasioned by administrative lapses on the part of the High Court. 4.11.8 More recently, the Supreme Court, in the case of Martha Wangari Karua v IEBC & 3 Others, Petition No. 3 of 2019, held that the courts lack jurisdiction to entertain a petition (and appeal) outside the constitutional timelines. The Apex Court opined that: Section 75 undoubtedly derives its authority from Article 87 of the Constitution which requires timely resolution of electoral disputes. We have already explained why there was a need to provide for defined timelines for settling electoral disputes. As such, we hold and maintain our position that once an election petition is filed at the High Court sitting as the Election Court, it must be determined within a period of 6 months… …Our holding above brings us to a more difficult question which is what happens, as in this case, where the 6 months’ period lapses as a result of an appellate process which was necessary for the enforcement of a litigant’s right of access to court. Is there any exception to the position we have already taken?... …We take the view that all the suggested propositions must be considered within the context of the strict timelines provided for the settlement of electoral disputes. We understand that these proposals seek to remedy the likelihood of denial of substantive justice due to impeding court processes or where a wrong cannot be corrected at the appellate stage due to lapse of time. Hence, a proper consideration of this issue requires a balancing of rights such as the right of appeal, access to Court, the right to have a matter adjudicated within the specified timeframes and the right to substantive justice… [Paras 48–49] 4.11.9 The Supreme Court then issued the following principles to guide the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over election petitions: BENCH BOOK ON ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION