(a)
The reasonable observer from whose perspective the decision is made
is sensitive to the exceptionally high value of political speech in a
democracy. As the Supreme Court held when considering whether a
demonstration intended to interrupt an ANZAC service was offensive
behaviour:53
A reasonable person, in a context involving freedom of
expression or another right guaranteed by the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act, must surely be a person who is sensitive
to such values and displays tolerance for the rights of the
person whose behaviour is in question. In other words, the
hypothetical reasonable person (of the kind affected) is one
who takes a balanced, rights-sensitive view, conscious of the
requirements of s 5 of that Act, and therefore is not
unreasonably moved to wounded feelings or real anger,
resentment, disgust or outrage …
(b)
It is the effect of the advertisement as a whole that matters. That
includes not only its words and images but also its style and apparent
purpose.
For example, it may be apparent that a publication is
intended to be funny or satirical or artistic. It is the advertisement’s
effect that matters, but the audience’s appreciation of the author’s
purpose may inform effect. For example, readers may have lower
expectations of factual accuracy in material that is intended to
entertain.
(c)
The advertisement must be considered in its factual context.
Its
relationship with other events may inform effect, as may its timing
relative to the election.
(d)
The relevant effect of the advertisement is its tendency to encourage
voting for a type of candidate or party, and then only by reference to
views or positions held or taken or not held or taken by that type of
candidate or party.
Thus advocacy about political issues is not
election advertising unless it has the effect of identifying the positions
of parties or candidates on those issues and encouraging voters to vote
by reference to those positions.
53
Morse v Police [2011] NZSC 45, [2012] 2 NZLR 1 at [64].