[21] (i) Whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to entertain Ms David’s Application; (ii) If the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction, what is the consequence in relation to this proposed appeal; (iii) If the Court of Appeal rightly assumed jurisdiction, what is the consequence in relation to this proposed appeal; and (iv) If the Court of Appeal rightly assumed jurisdiction but they exceeded their jurisdiction, what is the consequence in relation to this proposed appeal. The multiple sets of submissions received by the Court broadly fell into two camps. There were those supporting the view that Ms David had invoked the Court of Appeal’s original jurisdiction under Article 177(4) and that because, under that Article, its decision was final and unappealable, this Court lacked jurisdiction even to consider the Application by Messrs Ali and Jagdeo for Special Leave to appeal. And then there were those that supported the view that Article 177(4) was not in fact triggered by Ms David’s Application; that the Court of Appeal’s decision was not taken under that Article and that this Court was therefore entitled and required to set it aside and make appropriate consequential Orders. [22] The Court is exceedingly grateful for the extensive and thoughtful submissions we received. We mean no disrespect to counsel if in this judgment we did not address or single out particular submissions either with which we agreed or disagreed but which we found useful. The first question that must be determined is whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this Application for Special Leave. This Court’s Jurisdiction in the Context of Article 177(4) [23] Article 123(4) of the Constitution gives Parliament the power to ‘make such provision as it deems fit authorising any court established or to be established, as the final court of appeal for the Caribbean to be the final court of appeal for Guyana’. In keeping with this Article Parliament enacted the Caribbean Court of