28 NAMAT ALIYEV v. AZERBAIJAN JUDGMENT substance of the applicant's complaints, finding that he had not submitted duly certified copies of the relevant observers' affidavits and that he had not attached to his cassation appeal documentary proof that he had indeed applied to the CEC. It is not the Court's task to assess whether, from the standpoint of the domestic law, the domestic courts were correct to apply so strictly the civil procedure rules on admissibility of written evidence to a case giving rise to election-related issues which normally fall within the realm of public law. In the circumstances of the present case, however, the Court finds that such a rigid and overly formalistic approach was not justified under the Convention. 86. In this respect, the Court recalls the Venice Commission's Code of Good Practices in Electoral Matters, which cautions against excessive formalism in examination of election-related appeals, in particular where the admissibility of appeals is concerned (see paragraph 54 above). 87. As mentioned above, the Court considers that the applicant was able to put forward an arguable claim disclosing an appearance of a potentially serious violation of electoral rights and this claim was supported by relevant argumentation and evidence. This evidence included copies of observers' affidavits which appeared to be prima facie authentic. Although the applicant did not submit to the courts notarised copies of those affidavits, he claimed at the oral hearing in the Supreme Court that he had submitted the originals to the CEC. In such circumstances, the Court finds it puzzling that the domestic courts did not attempt to request the CEC to confirm whether it was in possession of those originals or to otherwise establish the authenticity of those affidavits. At the very least, the courts should have allowed the applicant an opportunity to supplement his written submissions with any additional evidence deemed necessary (such as documentary proof that he had indeed applied to the CEC). 88. The Court considers that, in order to ensure the State's compliance with its positive obligation under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to hold free elections, the domestic courts dealing with the present case, having been called upon to decide on an arguable claim concerning election irregularities, should have reacted by taking reasonable steps to investigate the alleged irregularities without imposing unreasonable and excessively strict procedural barriers on the individual complainant. What was at stake in those proceedings was not only the alleged infringement of the applicant's individual rights but also, on a more general level, the State's compliance with its positive duty to hold free and fair elections. Therefore, even assuming that the courts in the present case might have been unable to decide the case solely on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant, the material put before them was nevertheless strong enough to require them to take additional steps to obtain more information and verify the accuracy of the applicant's allegations which cast doubt on the free and fair character of the elections in his constituency.