iii) Administrative and financial independence 255. Special legal provisions in electoral laws for EMB financing are commonplace (see chapter 7 of Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook). However, such provisions for EDRBs are much less common, and it is rarely possible to speak of the financial self-sufficiency of EDRBs. However, there is a spectrum of financial independence which ranges from the annual allocation of a given percentage of the state budget provided for by constitutional law, as in Guatemala (see box 6.3), to those cases where there is no specific financial provision for the EDRB, as in Chile and Panama where the general common provisions on budgetary matters apply. These consist of a negotiation with the appropriate office of the executive branch in charge of drawing up a proposed budget to be submitted to the legislative branch for its consideration and approval. In Uruguay, although the executive branch can introduce changes to the proposed budget of the electoral body, both the amended and unamended budgets have to be submitted to the legislative branch for debate and approval. Box 6.3. Guatemala In Guatemala, 0.5 per cent of the General Budget of Regular Outlays is allocated to the EDRB, and in an election year this allocation is increased by the amount necessary as estimated by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral). If it does not receive the funds it needs, the Tribunal is authorized to take out bank loans or request any external assistance that does not compromise government finances or its own independence. 256. Between these two extremes are EDRBs which are allowed to submit their proposed expenditure budget directly to the legislative branch, as in Bolivia and Peru, and those in which no office of the executive branch is able to modify such proposals, as in Costa Rica and, as part of the budget for the judicial branch, Mexico and Venezuela. 257. Lack of financial autonomy can hinder effective dispute resolution. The Election Supervisory Committee for the Indonesian General Elections in 2004 (Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan Umum, PANWASLU), a body that was tasked by law with supervising the electoral process and had authority 93 6. Principles and guarantees of EDR systems 254. Another important aspect to consider in evaluating the degree of functional independence of specialized electoral courts or EMBs with judicial powers is their authority in budgetary and administrative issues. In some cases a preliminary proposed budget is drawn up by the president of the EDRB; in others, the EDRB itself draws up a proposed budget while in plenary session.