303. The possibility of the reappointment of members of the EDRB is often considered healthy as it allows for periodic evaluation of performance. This can give the opportunity to retain members who are professionally apt and suitable while incorporating new members who bring new insights and perspectives. However, this approach also carries a danger – the more frequent the reappointment process, the more opportunities there may be for the nominating body to control the appointments. 304. The stability of the EDRB itself is also important. There has been an evolution away from temporary bodies, whose lifespan often coincided with each election and the time needed to resolve any associated challenges, towards the establishment of permanent bodies. This has been fundamental to professionalizing and refining election procedures, and the lesson has been learnt that both the financial and the political cost of improvisation often turn out to be much greater than the cost of a permanent body. 305. A ‘career electoral judicial service’ is provided for in several countries, which acts as another structural guarantee which may promote stability and professionalism. It is characterized, among other things, by competitive or objective procedures for the recruitment, promotion and retention of the electoral service personnel. It is often good practice for vacancies in the top-level organs of an EDRB to be filled by professional personnel from within the ranks of the EDRB. This acts as a significant stimulus to permanent professional development and good performance. It also helps to maintain institutional memory and prevent EDRBs from having to bear the costs of learning that would accrue if their members and support staff were renewed in full. For example, the Electoral Court of the Judicial Branch of the Federation of Mexico has often conducted the recruitment of law clerks through public competition. There is a permanent training programme. Ten out of 15 regional electoral magistrates in post in mid-2010 had been law clerks at the Electoral Court before their appointment by the Senate, a process which involves the nomination by the Supreme Court of three candidates for each vacancy following a public advertisement and nomination hearings. v) Appropriate remuneration 306. As a structural guarantee for the members of the EDRB, several EDR systems provide as a matter of principle, drawing on the Anglo-American tradition, that the remuneration of the members may not be cut while they are performing their functions. This is particularly the case for those who are part of the judicial branch; it may also be true for members of constitutional courts or councils and of administrative courts. 307. Although it is not always set down in law, it is often a matter of public policy that the members of the EDRB receive remuneration appropriate 108