576. AEDR mechanisms, with their more informal nature, offer advantages that can add immense value to efforts to foster electoral justice. These include: • • • • easier, faster and more cost-effective access to justice; a less threatening environment for the disputants; the possibility of win-win outcomes for all disputants; and the opportunity to circumvent the problems of discredited EDR mechanisms. 577. AEDR mechanisms also have some weaknesses. In particular, they are ineffectual in the presence of an extreme power imbalance between disputants, that is, at balancing the interests of a weak disputant with those of a stronger disputant, and may not work when one party is uncooperative – especially in a multiparty dispute. b) Countries with extensive experience of permanent AEDR mechanisms 578. Alternative EDR mechanisms are not sufficiently developed, and there have been few studies of their effectiveness. However, many countries have some form of AEDR mechanisms: Afghanistan, related to local electoral bodies; Cambodia (see box 8.4); Ethiopia; Kenya; Lesotho; Malawi; Mexico, for certain local elections in indigenous or ethnic communities under the system of custom and practice; Samoa; South Africa; and Uganda. Box 8.4. AEDR in Cambodia Denis Truesdell The official EDR institutions in Cambodia include the National Election Commission (NEC) and the Constitutional Council. The NEC is responsible for deciding all complaints and appeals through the holding of public hearings, except for cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the judiciary. Electoral disputes are addressed at the level where they occur, starting with polling station officials, the Commune Election Commission (CEC) and the Provincial Election Commission (PEC). Appeals can be made against all decisions taken by these commissions on electoral complaints at the next level above, up to the NEC and ultimately to the Constitutional Council. Electoral disputes are therefore dealt with within electoral structures, outside the formal justice/court system which is out of the reach of the vast majority of the population, as well as being distrusted and associated with criminal matters. As a result, most Cambodians are accustomed to calling on local authorities, village chiefs, village elders and leaders of ethnic minorities, who make up informal bodies to arbitrate day-to-day disputes. However, there is no legal framework to guarantee people’s rights, nor is there a definitive settlement when these informal mechanisms are employed for dispute resolution. These actors are not empowered to settle disputes in a judicial 188