173. Some Central and East European countries have this type of EDRS. Examples are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Serbia, where the final decision on challenges to election results is entrusted to the country’s Supreme Court, after administrative challenges before an independent and autonomous EMB during the stage of preparing for the election have been exhausted. Some of the EMB’s decisions, in some of these countries, such as Hungary and Russia, can also be challenged before lower courts. 174. In Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Taiwan and Uganda the final resolution of challenges to the results of legislative elections is entrusted to the judicial branch. It vests in a superior court, usually on appeal after a decision from a district court, which is at a lower level than the Supreme Court. Challenges to the results of presidential elections in Taiwan and Uganda are entrusted, on appeal, to the Supreme Court. In Taiwan, all other challenges to electoral actions and decisions come under the jurisdiction of an autonomous administrative court, the rulings of which are final. 175. Challenges to the results of legislative elections in Japan, Kyrgyzstan, South Korea, Uzbekistan and Vanuatu are entrusted to the Supreme Court – in Japan and Kyrgyzstan on appeal but in South Korea, Uzbekistan and Vanuatu directly. 176. The most common EDR system around the world is one that entrusts the final resolution of challenges to election results to the regular courts of the judicial branch. Anyone designing such a system must take account of the independence and credibility of the judicial system. This is very important in emerging or consolidating democracies. Any lack of credibility of the judicial system and any perception, however unjustified, that it lacks independence or is under the control of the executive or the political party in government will seriously harm the credibility of the EDR system. ii) Constitutional courts or councils 177. Many European constitutions that date from the period immediately after the First World War (1914–18) follow, to varying extents, the model of the Austrian Constitution of 1920, which entrusted the task of ruling on the validity of elections to bodies with an expressly constitutional jurisdiction, some of which are part of the judicial branch while others are not. 178. In Austria, the verification of parliamentary elections has, since 1920, been assigned to the Federal Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof), the jurisdiction of which, through successive reforms, has been expanded to include the validation of other democratic exercises (referendums since 1929, presidential elections since 1931, and elections to local authorities and the organizations that represent professionals as provided for in law). The decisions 70