22
SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER
Opinion of the Court
light of voting discrimination in Shelby County, the county
cannot complain about the provisions that subject it to
preclearance. Post, at 23–30. But that is like saying that
a driver pulled over pursuant to a policy of stopping all
redheads cannot complain about that policy, if it turns out
his license has expired. Shelby County’s claim is that the
coverage formula here is unconstitutional in all its applications, because of how it selects the jurisdictions subjected to preclearance. The county was selected based on
that formula, and may challenge it in court.
D
The dissent proceeds from a flawed premise. It quotes
the famous sentence from McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 421 (1819), with the following emphasis: “Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.” Post, at 9 (emphasis in dissent). But
this case is about a part of the sentence that the dissent
does not emphasize—the part that asks whether a legislative means is “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the
constitution.” The dissent states that “[i]t cannot tenably
be maintained” that this is an issue with regard to the
Voting Rights Act, post, at 9, but four years ago, in an
opinion joined by two of today’s dissenters, the Court
expressly stated that “[t]he Act’s preclearance requirement and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional
questions.” Northwest Austin, supra, at 204. The dissent
does not explain how those “serious constitutional questions” became untenable in four short years.
The dissent treats the Act as if it were just like any
other piece of legislation, but this Court has made clear
from the beginning that the Voting Rights Act is far from
ordinary. At the risk of repetition, Katzenbach indicated